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From Stockholm to Nairobi to Caracas:
Route Toward a New International Law?
LYNTON K. CALDWELL
Possibly the single most powerful influence for change in law among nations
is the rapid and pervasive growth of the technologies of human communication.
This accelerating worldwide flow of information is giving the world the characteristics
of a "global village." And Marshall McLuhan has identified the principal agent
of change as the electronic telecommunications media which has "extended our
central nervous system in a global embrace," approaching "the final phase in
the extensions of man-the technological simulation of consciousness, when the
creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole
of human society."'
The exponential growth of efforts to formulate a new body of law for the
international environment is a direct consequence of this techno-psychological
revolution in the communication of information. It would therefore be erroneous to
evaluate recent developments in international environmental law by the criteria
of a nation-centered pre-electronic past. The effect of worldwide information flow
upon popular beliefs, concerns, behaviors, and institutions has profoundly altered
relationships among peoples and all forms of human organization, including
governments and international organizations.2 Communications technology (and
especially radio and television) has brought knowledge of reported events occurring
anywhere to unprecedented numbers of people everywhere, including illiterates
and persons living in the most isolated places on the Earth. The Earth as an
environment is beginning to assume in the minds of people a presence that it has
never had before. Similarly, technological developments in the extraction and
uses of energy have altered worldwide relationships, creating new dependencies
and constraints among nations.3 Atomic weapons have had a restraining effect
upon the political and military behavior of the great powers, while the international
transport of energy resources (notably of oil) has not only increased the vulnerability
of major industrial states but added to the probability of marine pollution, and
the political and economic leverage of their suppliers as well.
The uneven distribution and consumption of energy resources is paralleled
with respect to a broad spectrum of minerals and metals. Impending shortages
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enhance the bargaining position of the supplying states, and the General Assembly
of the United Nations in which these states now hold a balance of power devoted
its Sixth Special Session to a consideration of the equities and economics of world
resource distribution.4
These changes, and all that they imply, support the contention that recent
and continuing efforts to expand and elaborate international law relating to the
environment represent significant conceptual and political developments. Although
environmental issues appeared at the very beginnings of international law, many
of the current trends and doctrines depart so radically from customary expectations
and practices that it may not be an exaggeration to speak of the emergence of a
new international environmental law. 5
I. How STOCKHOLM WAs DIFFERENT
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment meeting in
Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, witnessed the culmination and convergence of trends
and efforts of at least the preceding decade.' The Conference had been carefully
planned over a period of four years following its proposal by the Ambassador of
Sweden to the United Nations on May 20, 1968. During this interval a 27-nation
Preparatory Committee and 7 Intergovernmental Working Groups, coordinated
by a small secretariat, put together the basic documentation of the Conference: an
agenda, a declaration, draft recommendations, and an action plan.'
These four years were also marked by a number of important international
gatherings, notably the Biosphere Conference at Paris in 1968 sponsored by
UNESCO,' the Environmental Symposium in Prague in 1971 sponsored by the
Economic Commission for Europe,' and a number of regional and technical
meetings directly sponsored by or closely related to the Stockholm Conference.
Supplementing these meetings were numbers of articles, books, and colloquia dealing
with the need for international action to protect the biosphere and its natural
species and systems. The Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee, who
became Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference, commissioned an
unofficial report on the state of the planetary environment prepared by Barbara
Ward and Rene Dubos with the assistance of an international committee of 152
correspondents.10
Prior concern with environmental relations among nations had been evident in
four major areas. The first was clarification of the responsibilities and rights of
nations regarding the exploitation and contamination of the common domain of
mankind-notably the open ocean and deep sea bed, the atmosphere, the
Antarctic continent, and outer space. The second was protection of plants, animals,
and ecosystems under national jurisdiction and endangered by human action.
The third was the structuring of an international system of information,
communication, and cooperation especially for monitoring changes and interactions
in the global environment. The fourth, which became the dominating issue at
Stockholm, was the relationship between environmental quality and economic
development. It is characteristic of these areas of concern that none is operationally
separable from two or all of the others. To understand the issues raised by action
in any of these areas, attention must be given to the others.
The direction of these efforts, trends, and concerns has been toward a
more positive international law and a more extensive and coherent network of
international institutional relationships. Neither the Stockholm Conference nor its
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antecedents necessarily reflected a growth of altruism or a willing spirit of cooperation
among nations. The new environmental policies of nations declared at Stockholm
were based more on collective apprehension than on universal goodwill.
Stockholm was the outgrowth of a still growing trend toward a universal sense
of the threat to human welfare implicit in a deteriorating world environment. Far
from utopian, Stockholm and its associated intergovernmental conferences were
moved by common knowledge concerning a threat that was commonly perceived.
Imperfect as it may have been, the knowledge base of the Stockholm Conference
has probably never been equaled in a conference of nations with so broad an agenda.
More than any other major international political event occurring thus far, the
Stockholm Conference was a direct consequence of the power of universalized science
catalyzing a common global awareness and concern through its technological spin-offs
in transportation, communication, and electronics.
Although Stockholm was a political and not a scientific gathering, the Conference
would never have occurred but for the universalization of scientific information and
method. At the forefront of the Conference were the political representatives of
nations, but science was present in the background. As one observer quipped,
behind every national delegate was a scientist telling him what to do, and a
foreign office representative telling him not to do it. The biospheric, ecological
assumptions of the world scientific community were seldom consistent with the
national self-interest views of traditional international politics, and the legacy of
Stockholm was a compromise between these attitudes.
Decisions would have gone more often against science at Stockholm had it
not been for the influence of public opinion which scientific information had helped
to form, and which the electronic media had helped to dramatize and disseminate.
Surely the most dramatic influence upon popular consciousness around the world
was the photograph of the planet Earth as seen from outer space by the
astronauts of the Apollo program. On Christmas Eve of 1968 electronic technology
for the first time permitted humanity to see its global habitat suspended in the cold
blackness of the universe. The motto of Stockholm, "Only One Earth," thus had an
emotional impact that could not have been so strong prior to the moon flights.
This simple powerful symbol of the Earth reinforced scientific fact with an emotional
response that transcended conventional barriers of language, culture, and ideology.
A variety of nongovernmental, unofficial, and ideological gatherings took place
at Stockholm coterminous with the United Nations Conference." Although these
meetings may have had little direct influence upon the deliberations of the
Conference, they reflected many of the political movements and pressures that had
brought the official delegates to Stockholm. Their presence at Stockholm was a
well-advertised reminder of the hopes and expectations of peoples in many parts
of the world for a positive and constructive outcome of the Conference. The
electronic media-especially photographic film and television, cheap printing,
and low international air fares-made possible a degree of common belief, of
communication, shared purpose, and a visible presence that had never previously
characterized high-level international conferences. The unofficial assembly of the
ecologically concerned-youth, radicals, scientists, and conservationists from around
the world-was more than facetiously described as "Woodstockholm," a ritual
celebration of an emotional commitment to a new orientation toward life and
the world.12
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But the most distinctive aspect of the United Nations Conference was its
action orientation. The leadership of Secretary-General Maurice Strong was
consistently directed toward operational outcomes. The exceptionally thorough
preparatory work on draft documents greatly simplified and, more importantly,
focused the deliberation of the Conference. The Declaration on the Human
Environment, the Action Plan, and the institutional machinery to activate the
Declaration and the Plan were the principal future-directed products of Stockholm."
Most importantly, through new institutional machinery-the Governing Council
for Environmental Programmes, a Secretariate headed by an Executive Director
elected by the General Assembly, the Environmental Coordinating Board of United
Nations agency representatives, and the Environment Fund-a way was provided
to obtain realization of the Action Plan. Thus, to an extent that has been exceptional
among international conferences, the Stockholm Conference proposed the means to
carry its recommendations into effect. These means made the Declaration and
Action Plan operational, and to this extent may be viewed as mechanisms for
change in international law.
II. THE LEGACY OF STOCKHOLM
Stockholm opened the way to operationalizing in the international milieu
a concern for the state of the environment heretofore largely limited by the
jurisdiction of sovereign national states. In effect, national states are merging
their sovereignty and jurisdiction to enable them to act collectively on a global
basis toward the realization of purposes that were previously definable only within
the limits of particular national jurisdictions.
How "new" this development may be is debatable. The internationalizing of
legal matters that were once exclusively national has been paralleled in relation
to human rights. One may argue that whenever multinational treaties are ratified in
new areas of human concern, a shift in jurisdiction from the exclusively national
to the inclusively international has occurred. And yet the scope and character
of the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan, and the creation of machinery for
implementation, point toward changes in law among nations that are not only "new"
in the emphasis accorded to older principles, but also strongly indicate the
emergence of legal concepts and arrangements nonexistent or relatively obscure
in traditional international law. The nations at Stockholm did not create a new
international law, but they marked out and broadened a route toward a new body
of substantive law-a process which subsequent events at Nairobi and Caracas
have continued.
Putting aside the question of the extent to which, or the way in which, the
Stockholm actions may eventually lead to juridical novelty, one may identify
four ways in which novelty was at least implicit in the Stockholm view of international
relations. There were significant elements of novelty in: (1) the definition of
international issues, (2) the rationale for cooperation, (3) the approach to the
definition of international responsibility, and (4) the conceptualization of
international organizational relationships.
Definition of Issues
The Conference agenda at Stockholm was divided into six main subject areas:"
(1) Planning and Management of Human Settlements for Environmental
Quality,'5
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(2) Environmental Aspects of Natural Resources Management,"
(3) Identification and Control of Pollutants and Nuisances of Broad
International Significance,'"
(4) Educational, Informational, Social and Cultural Aspects of
Environmental Issues,"
(5) Development and Environment," and
(6) International Organizational Implications of Action Proposals. 0
From these agenda items, 109 recommendations (or rather sets of
recommendations) were generated. Most of the numbered recommendations
consisted of several parts so that the total number of actions recommended greatly
exceeded the number of formal resolutions. For example, Recommendation 20,
concerned with strengthening machinery for the international acquisition of
knowledge and transfer of experience on soil capabilities, degradation, conservation,
and restoration, consisted of at least ten specific lines of action. Recommendation
86 to national governments regarding marine pollution included six separate
provisions. Recommendation 51 on international river basins comprised at least
thirteen subdivisions. One apparent reason for the extended character of these
and other recommendations of the Conference was the complex nature of the
problems or issues. Few of the issues in the Conference agenda could be defined or
dealt with in exclusive disciplinary or sectoral concepts and methodologies.
Literally by nature, the problems of the human environment being multidisciplinary
had to be approached with more complex strategies than those characteristically
employed historically in delineating the mutual obligations of nations in treaties or
by customary law.
The interlocking relationships among the Conference recommendations would
become even more apparent as implementation was attempted. It is a phenomenon of
environmental problems that when penetrated by inquiry they appear to expand
and complexify, revealing interconnections and interactions not apparent to superficial
examination. It is this dynamic complexity that calls for administrative action
in national affairs. National law is primarily administered and only exceptionally
adjudicated, and then with respect to delimitated questions and issues appropriate
to judicial action. But historical international law has been primarily adjudicated;
its administration, insofar as it can be said to be "administered," being the
almost exclusive responsibility of national governments. If, however, nations
collectively undertake efforts which in effect require administration beyond mere
voluntary concurrent action by national bureaucracies, they will have created
international legal responsibilities that the existing machinery for international
law cannot, nor was ever intended to, assume. Thus, to the extent that international
issues are defined in operational-administrative rather than obligatory-adjudicative
terms, they imply a kind of international law that resembles national law in that
it sets goals and prescribes action as well as determining obligations and rights.
The Rationale for Cooperation
The conflict between science advisers and foreign policy advisers at Stockholm
reflected differing assumptions regarding the bases of international cooperation.
Many of the scientists and more of the non-governmental participants in the
Environment Forum called for the institutionalization of new supranational loyalties
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to the planet and to all mankind. The logic of this viewpoint implied a positive
international law enforceable directly upon individuals and especially on international
business enterprise.
The foreign office view of environmental policy tended, with exceptions, to
guard national interests, as traditionally perceived, from sacrifice to an idealistic
cause. For example, France was unwilling to stop the atmospheric testing of nuclear
weapons; Japan to observe Recommendation 33 calling for a ten-year moratorium
on commercial whaling; the United States to accept the principle of "additionality,"
which would have required an increase in its foreign aid budget to cover the
"additional" costs imposed by environmental protection measures on development
projects. Nevertheless, there was widespread recognition that all nations had a
common interest in the preservation of the biosphere, and that for a wide range of
environment-related issues unilateral national action could not be made effectual.
Thus, as with the rationale behind the International Treaty on the Peaceful
Use of Outer Space (1966), the impetus for cooperation at Stockholm was a common
threat commonly perceived.
As with public anxiety over the threat of nuclear coercion and disaster
(a special kind of environmental hazard), something approximating a worldwide
public opinion had developed during the decade of the sixties. In several of
the major industrial countries, and on certain issues, national positions at Stockholm
were influenced by ecological politics at home. Several leading states had only
recently enacted new and significant environmental legislation, had reorganized
ministries and departments for environmental protection purposes, or both.
Environment had become a major public issue in Canada, Japan, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, and in these countries (among others) the issue
was both domestic and international. For example, Section 102 (E) of the
United States National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 declared that the Congress
authorizes and directs that all agencies of the Federal Government shall:
. . . recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States,
lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed
to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a
decline in the quality of mankind's world environment.
Similarly, Section 2, the preamble to the Act, extended the scope of national concern
beyond national boundaries ". . . to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare
of man . . ." In many developed countries, national and international, official
and unofficial seminars and conferences preceded the Conference. For example, in
April and May of 1972, the Canadian Preparatory Committee for the Conference
sponsored public regional consultations in eleven Canadian cities. Similar efforts
were mounted by the United Nations Associations of the Nordic Countries. Among
very numerous preconference meetings in the United States were a series of public
hearings by the Secretary of State's Citizen Advisory Committee.
Obviously in every nation there were issues on which government spokesmen
were not prepared to subordinate their perception of national interest to the
protection of the biosphere. But the remarkable outcome of Stockholm was the
extent of international consensus on the very broad and detailed provisions of
the Action Plan. National objections or abstentions with respect to particular
recommendations of the Conference were exceptional.
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The so-called "developing nations" differed from the industrial states with
respect to priorities and, in nearly all instances, with respect to the influence of public
opinion. In most developing countries public opinion, in a general sense, was
inchoate and inarticulate. No organized and influential citizens groups and no
independent, admonishing press were pushing their governments toward environmental
protection measures at home or at Stockholm. Even so, in many developing
countries a small but disproportionately influential elite in government and the
universities was aware of world trends and of a national stake in international
environmental protection measures. The existence of this opinion was attested in
1971 by a letter of inquiry sent by Francesco di Castri (then a professor in Chile)
to more than one hundred scientists in developing countries." Responses indicated
that concern over environmental deterioration did exist in many Asian, African, and
Latin American countries and that commitment to economic growth and
industrialization regardless of ecological or social cost was not as general among
their elites as many skeptics in the industrialized countries had believed.
Nevertheless, there were differences among nations in both the substance of and
perception of environmental problems, and these differences could easily have
defeated cooperative efforts at Stockholm.
In the main, the predicted confrontation at Stockholm between developed and
developing nations over the impact of environmental protection on development was
effectively contained, owing in large measure to the political skill of Secretary-
General Maurice F. Strong who had formerly headed the international development
program of the government of Canada, and to the thorough preparatory exercises
in which conflicting perspectives on environment and development were clarified and
largely (although not wholly) reconciled. The task of harmonizing environmental
and developmental objectives was considered by a series of pre-Stockholm meetings
convened by regional United Nations Economic Commissions." A meeting of
scientists from developing countries was convened by the International Council of
Scientific Unions' Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE)
on the occasion of the XII (1971) Pacific Science Congress in Canberra; and a
working group of experts on environment and development met at Founex,
Switzerland at the invitation of Secretary-General Strong.23
These and other preconference actions provided elements of a common
foundation in knowledge for the representatives of the 113 nations participating in
the Stockholm Conference. The establishment of a foundation did not mean
that a new edifice of international law would be immediately erected upon it.
But without this common base, action toward this new international environmental
law could never be commenced.
Approach to the Definition of International Responsibility
Although the Stockholm conference was conducted according to the traditional
protocol of international conferences, the importance of the nongovernmental
input to the Conference at national and international levels and the presence of the
unofficial gatherings at Stockholm made inevitable a broader than customary
scope for international deliberations. This broadening pertained not only to the
substance of international law but more particularly to its subjects. Classic
international law was the law of nations, not of individuals or of nongovernmental
organizations. But the Stockholm resolutions were directed not only to hational
governments, but also to "peoples," to international agencies, and to governments
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collectively with respect to issues requiring their collective action. Illustrations
of this latter class of issues may be drawn from Recommendations 86 to 94 dealing
with Marine Pollution. And reference in the Conference Declaration to the "common
international realm" must include the high seas and the seabed and ocean floor,
already subject to action by the General Assembly of the United Nations and
a major concern of the Third United Nations Conference on The Law of the Sea."
The preamble to the Declaration of the Conference was addressed in effect
to "the peoples of the world" for the preservation and guidance of the human
environment. Paragraph 7 of the preamble specifies the locus of responsibility for
achieving the objectives of the Conference:
7. To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of
responsibility by citizens and communities and by enterprises and institutions
at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts. Individuals in all
walks of life as well as organizations in many fields, by their values and
the sum of their actions, will shape the world environment of the future.
Local and national governments will bear the greatest burden for large-scale
environmental policy and action within their jurisdictions. International
co-operation is also needed in order to raise resources to support the
developing countries in carrying out their responsibilities in this field.
A growing class of environmental problems, because they are regional or
global in extent or because they affect the common international realm, will
require extensive co-operation among nations and action by international
organizations in the common interest. The Conference calls upon
Governments and peoples to exert common efforts for the preservation and
improvement of the human environment, for the benefit of all the people
and for their posterity.
Obviously this provision in no way changes the subjects of international law,
but to the extent that individuals and the variety of organizations included in
paragraph 7 interact in carrying out new efforts and programs transcending national
boundaries, the ultimate extension of international law to these activities and
relationships seems unavoidable."
Principle 1 of the Declaration was addressed to the rights and responsibilities
of individuals, with the implication (elsewhere made explicit in Conference
Recommendations 95, 96, and 97 pertaining to educational, informational, social,
and cultural aspects of environmental problems) that national governments with the
assistance of international agencies should enable their people to become informed
on environmental issues. The substance of numerous recommendations was what
governments should do in relation to their own people rather than, as in traditional
international law, what a national state should or should not do in relation to
other national states.
An issue with more solid implications for possible changes in international law
was the extent of the responsibility of the so-called developed or rich nations to
assist the less developed or poor nations in reconciling their development efforts with
environmental quality objectives.26 Two aspects of this issue took shape at Stockholm
and have remained points of controversy in the post-Stockholm period. These
aspects were expressed in Conference Recommendations 103, regarding
"compensation,"27 and 107, regarding "additionality.""
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Paragraph b) of Recommendation 103 stated the compensation issue in essence:
That where environmental concerns lead to restrictions on trade, or to
stricter environmental standards with negative effects on exports, particularly
from developing countries, appropriate measures for compensation should
be worked out within the framework of existing contractual and institutional
arrangements and any new such arrangements that can be worked out
in the future ....
The principle of additionality was formalized in several of the pre-Stockholm
meetings of the regional Economic Commissions and in the Preparatory Committee,
and subsequent to Stockholm by Resolution 3002 (XXVII) of the General Assembly
(December 15, 1972). Its clearest expression at Stockholm was in Recommendation
107 which declared that: "Environmental problems should not affect the flow of
assistance to developing countries, and that this flow should be adequate to
meet the additional environmental requirements of such countries."
More specifically the impact of this concept was that existing development
funds should not be diverted to environmental quality purposes, and that funds
to carry out the recommendations of the Stockholm Conference should be in
addition to those now allocated to developmental purposes. Both the compensation
and additionality principles represent efforts to establish a new relationship of
rights and obligations between nations-in this instance, between developed
and developing nations. The great majority of nations and members of the United
Nations belong to the latter group where they often form a bloc known as the 77
in the General Assembly. The prevalence of liberal and social democratic attitudes
in most of the developed countries provides a political climate generally propitious
for the acceptance of these principles as standards of international political
behavior, even though not yet embodied in positive international law.
With respect to an established principle of international law, that a state must
compensate for injury to another state caused by activities originating on its own
territory, the Conference through Principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration took
a reinforcing position. Principle 22, however, moved ahead of traditional practice,
stipulating that "States shall co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding the liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such
states to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
In summation, a legacy of Stockholm was a greatly enlarged or reinforced
conceptualization of national responsibility that had direct bearing upon the future
of international organizational relationships.
Conceptualization of International Organizational Relationships
In a review of the first year following Stockholm, Maurice Strong emphasized
the organizational logic of the Stockholm recommendations which in his words
called for ". . . a drastically new concept of management .* ""' Conceding that for
many purposes the hierarchical bureaucratic structure of governments and
international organizations had worked well in the past, he observed that this
form of organization ". . . has made it difficult to perceive-and even more difficult
to deal with-complex environmental cause-and-effect relationships that transcend
traditional disciplinary and institutional boundaries." Continuing, he declared
that ". . . the environment cannot be sectoralized. It is a system of interacting
relationships that extends through all sectors of activity, and to manage these
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relationships requires an integrative approach for which present structures were not
designed." This means, he said, "that lines of communication and decision-making
must be given much greater horizontal and trans-sectoral dimensions than are
provided for in existing structures." Thus ". . . the new patterns of organization in
an era of societal management must be based on a multitude of centers of
information and of energy and of power, linked together within a system in which
they can interact with each other."
These views of Maurice Strong reflect not only the logic of Stockholm and the
organizational strategy for the United Nations Environmental Programme; they also
indicate the almost certain direction of international organization in the future,
and hold far-reaching implications for the structure, the subject matter, the
subjects, and the processes of international law.
The concept of sovereignty is central to the organizational issue. Although the
Declaration speaks of sovereign right and the sovereignty and interests of states,
the total effect of the document is to modify the exercise of sovereignty. The
traditional view of sovereignty is obviously inconsistent with Maurice Strong's view
of the organizational requirements of planetary environmental protection, except
as Strong himself has interpreted the use of sovereignty. Nations may merge
their sovereignty. He writes:
But the development of new international machinery to deal with the
complex problems of an increasingly interdependent technological civilization
will not come about through the surrender of sovereignty by national
governments but only by the purposeful exercise of that sovereignty.
It is only when nations find themselves incapable of exercising their
sovereignty effectively or advantageously on a unilateral basis that they
will agree-reluctantly-to exercise it collectively by agreement with
other nations. It is seldom that nations enter into arrangements which
restrict their ability to exercise their sovereignty until circumstances
compel them to do so.
The salient characteristics of this new organizational structure are flexibility and
informality. In contrast to traditional international relations, substantive purpose
and the means to achieve it gain attention, whereas procedural matters and protocol
become relatively less important. Of course this strengthens trends already
initiated through the United Nations Specialized Agencies and the United Nations
Development Programme, but it carries further the idea of a coherent network
of organizations of diverse status-governmental and nongovernmental, international,
regional, national, and local. The United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) also carries further the type of mission orientation previously specified by
the General Assembly for UNDP and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD).ao Its agenda having largely been prescribed, its focus
must almost unavoidably be upon the means to action.
To assist the formation of this network and its constructive interaction is a
principal task of the United Nations Environment Programme. The difficulties
and hazards are all too apparent. As Maurice Strong has said, the effort will require
". .. a degree of enlightened political will on the part of the peoples and nations
of the world that is without precedent in human history."
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II. FROM STOCKHOLM TO NAIROBI: ESTABLISHING THE
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME
The two years following the Stockholm Conference have been characterized by
trends and influences apparent at the Conference, but changes have occurred in
their relative strength and momentum. As hitherto noted, these changes accentuate
an evolution in international relations that had been underway before Stockholm
and were visible in other United Nations affairs. Possibly the most significant and
certainly the most puzzling was the paradox of power exercised in the General
Assembly and in those parts of the United Nations system concerned with trade,
development, natural resources, and social affairs.
The paradox lies in the discrepancy between the economic, technical, scientific,
and industrial power of the major developed states and the relative weakness in
all of these respects by the so-called Group of 77 developing nations that dominate
the General Assembly and, to some extent also, the Secretariate. To the extent
that the developing states present a common front, they enjoy a political advantage
that could be significant for the future of international law. This advantage
follows from two weaknesses among the developed nations: first is the ideological
division between the Soviet and Western blocs of states; second is their growing
vulnerability to materials shortages and to disruption of their economic systems.3
This vulnerability of the developed nations is most acute in Western Europe,
North America, and Japan. It was dramatized by the crisis of the Arab oil
embargo of 1973-74 and was articulated in the debates at the Sixth Special Session
of the General Assembly of the United Nations on "the problems of raw materials
and development."" The tone of representatives from the developing countries
was hostile and strident, and generally supportive of a United Nations charter
for the economic rights and duties of nations which would have as its objective a
massive equalization of wealth between the developed and developing nations.
This consolidating of the political interests of developing countries never fully
materialized at Stockholm, but became effective in the Twenty-Seventh (regular)
Session of the General Assembly in the establishment of UNEP. The General
Assembly accepted the Stockholm recommendations, modified only by an enlargement
of the membership of the Governing Council from 54 to 58 to accomodate more
representation from Asian countries. The developing countries controlled the
Council, a fact symbolized by locating the headquarters of UNEP in Nairobi."
In addition to establishing the machinery of UNEP, the General Assembly referred
the Action Plan to the Governing Council, called its attention to the principles
stated in the Declaration on the Human Environment, and instructed the Council
to give special consideration in the formulation of programs and priorities to
environmental measures which might assist in accelerating the economic development
of developing countries." The argument of the less developed countries was that
their major environmental problem was underdevelopment.
The First Session of the Governing Council was held at Geneva, 12 to 22 of
June, 1973." The first order of business was the adoption of General Procedures
to Govern the Administration of the Environment Fund. Debate proved contentious
with a determined, but in the end not wholly successful, effort to restrict the
initiative of the Executive Director and vest all significant policy decisions in the
Council. The second major consideration was to determine the provisions of
the Action Plan that would receive UNEP's initial attention. In this determination
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the development priorities of the Council majority were evident. The subject of
human settlements headed the priorities list, the Council noting that the "quality
of human life must constitute the central concern of the Programme," and therefore
that "the study of problems having an immediate impact on man should be
given the highest priority."" In the end the Council was content to adopt 44 topics
for action, leaving their ordering as to action largely up to the Secretariate.
The Second Session of the Governing Council met in Nairobi, 10 to 23 March
of 1974." Action taken included approval of a United Nations Conference on
Habitat and Human Settlements to be held in Vancouver in June, 1976; establishment
of Earthwatch (global environmental assessment); further support for a global
environmental monitoring system (GEMS); and a system of information
referral services.
Preceding the Second Session, a number of international meetings took place
in Nairobi for the purpose of providing input to the Session. Two in particular
deserve attention. The first was a meeting sponsored by ICSU's SCOPE of scientists
from the developing countries-a sequel to the 1971 meeting in Canberra.
The second was a four-day meeting of representatives of nongovernmental
organizations. The NGO group reviewed the Council agenda, adopted resolutions,
and agreed to create a permanent NGO Environment Center in Nairobi. In its
own way as symbolic of the time-space milieu of UNEP in locating its headquarters
in Nairobi, was a demonstration on March 15 of transoceanic communication
utilizing computerized information. The purpose of this exercise was to demonstrate
that the sophisticated technology of electronics and computerized information
services can now be made universally available. This linkage of information sources
and users was doubly symbolic because, as the UNEP press release noted, the
"NGOs represent networks of communication vital for citizen participation
in environment programs.
This joining of organizational and telecommunications networks is a phenomenon
that makes plausible Maurice Strong's concept of effective action through
decentralized relationships totally unlike the bureaucratic hierarchies of traditional
government. The precise significance of this development for the future of
international law is not clear, but the conclusion cannot easily be escaped that at
least three influencing factors will gain significance.
The first factor is knowledge, which, with respect to environmental problems,
ultimately implies scientific knowledge. Second are the sources of knowledge.
These sources include not only the repositories of information, e.g. libraries and data
banks; they also include delivery systems, and the holders and creators of
knowledge (both organizations and individuals) and the managers of the information
systems. Both of these factors significantly increase the role of nongovernmental
organizations and individuals, and especially those dealing with science and
technology, that, like ICSU, can generate multiple networks of information
and expertise.
The third factor is time. The process of information exchange and
communication can now take place within unprecedentedly short intervals of time.
But rapid air travel brings NGO representatives to Nairobi, and the softening of
barriers between official and unofficial status-implicit in observer and consultative
arrangements between the United Nations system and NGOs-permits influence
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to enter the process of international negotiation and decision-making. This could
never have been as fully developed in the pre-aerospace electronic age.
At the end of the Second Session of the Governing Council, observers generally
agreed that UNEP had survived the critical stage of birth and that the prospects
for significant accomplishment could be viewed with modest optimism. Yet Maurice
Strong's assessment one year after Stockholm was still valid:
For environmental actions taken to date are still of fairly marginal
significance compared with those yet to be confronted. The difficult
choices-about the imbalance created by man's activities, about equity in
the use of common resources, about the sharing of power both within
national societies and internationally, about the fundamental purposes of
growth and the sharing of its benefits as well as its costs-remain to
be made."
The nations at Nairobi demonstrated the practicality of limited action within
defined areas of agreement; for example, the feasibility of the global environmental
monitoring system within the Earthwatch program. But the Nairobi commitments
had largely to do with arrangements for information and assistance. Few of the
priority topics implied possible interference with or reorientation of national
priorities. Yet even this latter possibility did not prevent passage by the Council
of a resolution asking the Executive Director to prepare proposals for "cooperation
in the field of the environment concerning natural resources shared by two or
more states."40
National governments, however, ultimately would determine how and when
the Stockholm recommendations would be implemented. Post-Stockholm efforts
to extend international law by conventional methods proved disappointingly slow.
The NGOs at Nairobi urged the Governing Council to push the ratification of
the four major conventions negotiated during and after the Stockholm Conference.
These were:
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping Wastes and Other Matter, London, Mexico City,
Moscow, and Washington, 29 December, 1972.
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
from Ships, London, 2 November, 1973.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington,
3 March, 1973.
Convention on the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 23
November, 1972.
These treaties had been negotiated with considerable difficulty, but also with
substantial international support. But once open for ratification, the nations
were not in a hurry to act, with low priority rather than domestic opposition the
principal retarding factor.
IV. FRoM NAIROBI TO CARACAs: How FARl? How FAST?
But a critical test of how far and how fast the events leading to and following
from Stockholm mark the route to a new international law could be the outcome
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of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which held its
principal working session in Caracas from 20 June to 29 August of 1974.
The declared purpose of the Conference was to adopt a comprehensive convention
on all matters relating to the law of the sea. The meeting at Caracas was the
largest international conference in history comprising more than 5,000 official
delegates and observers from 148 nations. Confronting the Conference were
at least 100 identifiable issues including the establishment of uniform territorial
limits and costal zones in relation to fisheries, minerals, and other resources;
international laws regarding the deep seabed; provisions governing navigation in
territorial waters; and regulations controlling marine pollution.4
Twice before, in 1958 and 1960, the United Nations sponsored conferences
on the law of the sea. These efforts failed to achieve any substantial agreement.
Unlike Stockholm where shaping the future of international law was a by-product
but not a direct objective of the Conference, Caracas was convened for the
express purpose of clarifying, codifying, and extending a massive sector of the
corpus of international law."
In this objective the nations at Caracas failed-at least for the time.
The adjournment of the inconclusive Caracas meeting was to be followed in 1975
by a resumption of efforts to reach agreement on the terms of a treaty. But the
political cleavages evident at Caracas augured ill for early agreement and indicated
the growing fragility of the structure of international cooperation.4 The critical
division was less between the littoral and landlocked states than between the
so-called Third World countries and the developed nations. Militant ideological and
nationalistic postures perturb the political atmosphere in which international
law for the global environment must develop. The content of an adequate law for
the world's oceans and for its more-inclusive biosphere is more evident than the
route by which that law may become effective. The principal obstacle to the
establishment of this law is today the growing hostility of the Third World countries
to the developed nations in general and the United States in particular. This animus
may be summarized in the expression "the Algiers syndrome."
V. CAN STOCKHOLM SURVIVE ALGIERS? THE HAZARD OF DIvISIvE FORCES
The Charter of Algiers adopted in October 1967 at the Ministerial Meeting of
the Group of 77 non-aligned states is symbolic of the single most apparent threat
to implementation of the Stockholm doctrines and to the prospect for universal
international law: The so-called North-South conflict between developed and
developing nations." The Charter reaffirmed demands of the developing nations
expressed in a number of previous declarations (e.g. Belgrade, 1961 and Cairo,
1962) and embodied in the Final Act of the 1964 United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development [UNCTAD]." Among the detailed provisions of the
Charter was the proposition that one percent of the national income of developed
countries be made available to developing countries. Although moderate in tone,
the Charter emphasized the determination of the developing countries to maintain a
united front on behalf of economic concessions from the developed world. With
the exception of the issue of the natural products of developing countries vs.
new synthetics in the developed countries, the Charter of Algiers was not concerned
with environmental issues. But the Charter expressed Third World priorities as
they stood in 1967 and were again affirmed at Stockholm. Beneath the formality
of the international declaration was the smoldering resentment of the poorer
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nations, becoming progressively more explosive as the developed world failed
to satisfy their demands.
Whether the provisions and underlying sentiments of the Charter of Algiers can
be reconciled with the Action Plan of Stockholm in a world in which economic
and environmental problems are mounting rapidly is highly uncertain. Where,
in a world of limited resources, will the means be found to achieve both economic
and environmental objectives? Will economic antagonisms among blocs of states
offset their sense of common environmental danger? Or will nations manage,
for the environment, the kind of antagonistic cooperation that historically has
sometimes occurred between rival states?
Although the Second Session of the Governing Council of UNEP was generally
harmonious, the Sixth Special Assembly of the United Nations during 1974 did
not offer an encouraging prospect for a cooperative future. Efforts among the
developing nations to redistribute the world's wealth have come at a time when the
more affluent nations are discovering that they are not as rich as had been thought.
Pressures for material consumption through the raising of lower incomes in the West,
increased production of consumer goods in the Soviet bloc, and general inflationary
trends, have been reducing the ability of and political expediency in the developed
nations to accede to Third World demands.
While this conflict, of uncertain dimensions, is the most apparent threat to the
development of a universal international environmental law, it is only one of
several concurrent forces which interact with it, creating a complexity that makes
difficult any assessment of the relative influence of related trends.
The developing nations would be in a better position to use their natural
resources to bargain for higher prices and more aid were they not restrained
by several limiting circumstances. Their common bond in opposition to the
developed nations is largely psychological: they share a feeling of political inferiority,
a resentment born of impatience and frustration. They differ among themselves
in almost every respect, with extremes ranging from China and India to Mauritius
and Barbados. They differ greatly in the extent of their wealth or poverty and in
their human and material resources. Many of them face ominous hazards from
uncontrolled population growth and precariousness of food supply. Few have,
or could support, a science-technology infrastructure comparable to those of
the leading industrial states. In addition, adverse reactive strategies in developed
countries could greatly weaken the effectiveness of the message from Algiers.
On December 6, 1974, the chief United States delegate to the United Nations warned
the General Assembly of the risks to the future of the United Nations in efforts
by the Third World coalition to coerce the developed nations through "one-sided,
unrealistic resolutions that cannot be implemented." Similar apprehensions were
voiced by representatives from France, the German Federal Republic, and the
United Kingdom.46
Apart from whatever dependence they may have on the developtng countries,
the industrial states are moving toward more conserving policies in the uses of
materials and energy. Environmental quality considerations have, in part, induced
this trend, but the energy problem, the anticipation of future shortages, and
sensitivity to Third World threats have given it impetus. The developed nations
have heretofore made relatively little use of their research and development
capabilities to reduce consumption of raw materials. Now, however, economic as
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well as environmental considerations are forcing attention to materials substitutes,
recycling, and miniaturization, among other techniques, to reduce the amount of
materials processed through the industrial systems and to reduce dependence
on supply sources of increasing unreliability.
How far this trend toward national self-sufficiency can be carried is uncertain.
But only the United States and the Soviet Union would appear able to approximate
autarchy, were they willing to make the costly attempt to do so. As a consequence.
a politics of accomodation may offer the least unattractive course for all nations,
once the counterproductive consequences of political blackmail and threatening
rhetoric have become evident. International goodwill may not be a necessary
condition for Stockholm to survive Algiers.
In summation, the route toward a new international environmental law will
probably be torturous and uncertain. It will be marked by periods of tension
and antagonism, but the adversities of nations may as often advance the development
of international law as retard it. The interrelating character of environmental
problems induces chain reaction effects, as efforts to modify or extend the law in
one area of international environmental affairs impinge upon a sequence of relating
issues. Thus an optimistic view of possibilities is that nations may be compelled
by the hard facts of life to transcend their antagonisms to an extent essential
to their survival.
In the future, as in the past, one function of international law will be to
formalize and clarify procedures to deal with emergent problems. The international
environmental developments noted in this paper, e.g. global monitoring, supervision
of the seabed, protection of endangered species, resource allocation, and many
others, will require institutional arrangements differing from those with which
nations have had experience. Innovation in legal principles and procedures is an
almost certain consequence of such developments. Innovations in principle have
been among the more obvious outputs of the international environmental conferences
and programs since 1968. As these principles are translated, often reluctantly,
into operations and regulations, procedural questions are sure to arise, and these
will probably necessitate the invention of fact-finding, rule-making, and adjudicative
machinery that does not now exist. In an electronic age, the deliberative procedures
of traditional international law may prove unadaptable to the needs of nations
trying to cope under constraints of time with highly complex and often technical
problems involving conflict with other nations. Thus the emergence of a new
international law for the environment is as safely predictable as any other probable
social development. But its outlines, beyond the very general configurations
identified in this paper, cannot now clearly be foreseen.
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